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The ongoing shifts in the global distribution of material and normative powers, particularly between the United States and China, have significant repercussions on the foreign policy strategies of smaller, weaker actors in the international system. Due to their limited capacity for dictating international politics in ways that could guarantee their survival, many in IR have argued that they usually prefer to operate within the prevailing status quo rather than attempting to revise it. Nevertheless, the Philippines, under the leadership of President Rodrigo Duterte, seems to disprove this observation by dramatically pivoting towards Beijing and away from Washington, at least rhetorically. This paper moves beyond the commonly cited systemic factors and domestic intervening variables affecting the states’ foreign policies by examining the neglected emotions and emotional beliefs that help shape these instruments. My investigation of these unseen, albeit existing mechanisms, reveals the centrality of Duterte’s emotionally constituted and strengthened beliefs in providing a more complete and realistic explanation to his China-centric (as opposed to US-centric) foreign policy stance. As I argue and demonstrate throughout the paper, because emotions and emotional beliefs are powerful engines of human behaviour, they exert enormous influence on any state leader’s foreign policy motivations, decisions, and actions.

How does a once familiar and benign ethnoreligious community become a stranger and a threat? This article examines the underlying causal mechanisms driving rival ethnoreligious factions within pluralistic polities to frame each other as threats to their relative security, power, and status. Drawing on complementary theories from critical security, religious, and nationalism studies, I develop a framework that captures and explains the processes and dynamics through which threatening conceptions and narratives about the ethnoreligious others are constructed, socialized, and legitimized over time. To theoretically probe and empirically demonstrate the utility of this framework, I examine how the collective imagined insecurities among Muslim and Christian communities in Indonesia have crystallized into tangible security threats using the interpretive process tracing method. Evidences produced from my theoretical and empirical analyses using the novel qualitative data I gathered from my field research reveal that this chauvinistic, zero-sum phenomenon proceeds via a three-phase othering causal mechanism comprised of cultivation of hostile emotive effects of ethnoreligious nationalism, securitization of othered ethnoreligious groups using hostile symbolic predispositions, and sacralization of hostile perceptions of indivisible ethnoreligious identities and homelands.

In the contemporary Asia-Pacific context, the fault lines leading to the Thucydides trap can be attributed to the continuing strategic competition between a seemingly declining United States and a rising China. Failure to circumvent this trap can ultimately result in a war of all against all. Against this backdrop, this article investigates how a small power re-evaluates its foreign policy and strategic behaviour using neoclassical realism theory. In particular, I examine President Rodrigo Duterte’s method which is characterized by four key elements: cultivating a more favourable image for China; moderating the country’s American-influenced strategic culture; mobilizing state-society relations supportive of `Sinicization’; and reorienting the country’s Western-based institutions to better accommodate Chinese pressures and incentives. Does a China-centric approach give a small power an indispensable strategic capital to successfully navigate and exploit both the challenges and opportunities of the impending new order? Do the Philippines’ shifting rules of engagement under the Duterte administration represent a forward-thinking strategic outlook rather than a defeatist and naïve stance? The article answers these questions by examining the factors and dynamics underpinning the conception and construction of the Duterte method, as well as its implications vis-a-vis a small power’s foreign policy and strategic behaviour.

In the wake of North Korea’s progressive missile testing that set even the usually stoic Japanese people into a panic mode, Japan has found itself at the mercy of its former enemies. In an ironic twist of fate, Tokyo’s security outlooks seem to have become hostage to the strategic calculations of its fiercest nemesis in the past. This paper asks whether Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s desire for constitutional change is precipitated mainly by the resurgence of Japanese nationalist sentiments as what many of his critics claim, or if there are genuinely rational justifications for revising the country’s 72-year old Constitution. And if so, why has it been so elusive for many Japanese leaders? Using neoclassical realism theory, I analyze the structural contexts and domestic intervening variables that simultaneously drive and prevent the realization of constitutional change in Japan. I argue that state leaders like Abe and those who have come before him have always been prone to acquiring flawed and inaccurate perceptions of the systemic stimuli; susceptible to making irrational and unsound decisions; and ineffective at mobilizing the national resources demanded by their preferred policies and strategies. Thus, despite having rational justifications, the quest for constitutional change has remained elusive for many Japanese leaders. Success will require Abe to carefully harmonize domestic and international expectations; prudently balance Japan’s benign security intentions and hawkish military strategies; and shift away from his pragmatic–ambivalent style of domestic politics.

In the age of growing global populism, the continued popularity and relevance of a populist government is anchored on the ability of its populist leader to convince the voters that the primary objective of his foreign policies is to secure the interests of the state and its citizens. However, without an adequate level of state power, pursuing realist foreign policies to improve the state’s relative gains and position in the international system can pose significant risks even for the most influential populist leader. Hence, the question is, how do populist leaders acquire an adequate level of state power to implement realist foreign policies, without ultimately losing their political capital and institutional legitimacy in the process? To answer this question, I develop a model that illustrates the three-way linkage between populism, securitization, and realism. I use this model to explain the rationale behind President Donald Trump’s `America First’ doctrine, as well as its implications for U.S. foreign policy making. I argue that ``populist securitization’’ is a conduit through which populist leaders formulate, execute, and justify their realist foreign policies. Using Trump’s securitization of the U.S. economy as a case study, I reveal how a populist securitization act can trigger the illiberal tendencies and nativist sentiments of the nationalistic voters, which, in turn, allow populist leaders to maintain their popularity and legitimacy among these voters while they experiment with realist foreign policies.

Our assumptions about the nature and conduct of contemporary international politics deeply impact how we view maritime disputes plaguing the East and South China Seas. In this article, our analysis of the push and pull factors that influence the extent and possible resolution of maritime disputes in East Asia reveals that war is neither opposed in principle nor completely forbidden as an alternative. Amid heightening maritime tensions in the region, we argue that the underlying forces sustaining complex interdependence are what prevent rival states from engaging into a realist-inspired, zero-sum warfare. However, this is not to suggest that economic interdependence creates an absolute power that completely eradicates these flashpoints, and neither do we imply that it faithfully reflects East Asia’s maritime political reality. Although East Asian countries (particularly the more powerful ones) may think that open war can be justified, as a matter of practical utility, avoiding it is likely to be more effective in achieving the goals of a given conflict.

This paper examines the manner through which the Philippine government has utilized free trade in pursuing its development-oriented national security policies and strategies in the twenty-first century. It argues that against the backdrop of uneven economic development being perpetuated by a deeply entrenched oligarchic system and patronage culture, the primary referent of Philippine national security is its diminishing development space. Despite the government rhetoric with regard to the role of inclusive development in enhancing national security, the Philippine political economy remains highly oligarchic and patrimonial. Such a condition has resulted in institutionalized inequality and structural poverty that undermine the country’s supposedly development-based security model. The ability of the very few yet very powerful Filipino elites to transform the country into an oligarchipelago underscores the inefficiencies emanating from this type of politico-economic arrangement. In light of this, the paper evaluates the impacts of the Philippines’ free trade activities on its overall level of development space by focusing on several crucial aspects of free trade that the government has failed to properly consider. Moreover, it scrutinizes the key factors that affect the utility of free trade for securing and enhancing the Philippines’ development space. The paper concludes by arguing that the Philippine government’s attempts at linking its development-centric security interests and free trade objectives have resulted not only in the preservation of uneven economic development and but also the further reinforcement of the existing oligarchic system and patronage culture in the country.

The Barisan Nasional’s construction and implementation of ideational and material security apparatuses has created a one-sided internal security dilemma in Malaysia. This paper argues that the noble objective of promoting Malay interests has been transformed to the venal objective of securing Barisan’s political perpetuity that is being pursued under the pretext of achieving inter-ethnic parity within a pluralistic Malaysia. The government’s quest for a bumiputra-imagined nation gave birth to affirmative action policies that have often worked at the expense of all other Malaysian ethnic groups, particularly the Chinese and Indian-Malaysians. For better or worse, Malaysia’s national security is conceived and developed on the basis of bumiputra ethnicity. In other words, Malaysia’s national security is designed to counter mainly the insecurities confronting the Malays, thereby generating a one-sided internal security dilemma.

This paper seeks to explore and explain the process through which Taiwan utilizes free trade – both at multilateral and bilateral levels – in enhancing its shrinking de facto sovereignty against the backdrop of ubiquitous `China factor’ in the twenty-first century. It argues that China’s sinicization project creates a scenario wherein increasing cross-strait stability ironically leads to decreasing de facto sovereignty for Taiwan. Due to this existing cross-strait security dilemma, Taiwanese leaders are being forced to preserve the island’s quasi-independent statehood due to fears of losing its remaining de facto autonomy over domestic and foreign affairs. In essence, Taiwan chooses to be de facto free by remaining de jure unfree. Taiwan’s sovereign space, therefore, becomes a pivotal referent object of its national security policy and strategy. Balancing between the two paradoxical interests of enhancing sovereignty while maintaining the Chinese-dominated cross-strait status-quo underlines the relentless games, changes, and fears that Taiwan confronts today.

This article examines Taiwan’s cross-strait relations with China by analyzing the linkages between their respective security interests and free trade objectives in the twenty-first century. It argues that these entanglements induce a scenario akin to the prisoner’s dilemma that compels Taiwanese leaders and policymakers to preserve the Chinese-dominated cross-strait status quo. To enhance their political appeals during general elections, the major political parties in Taiwan are being forced to cooperate with each other, albeit artificially. By adopting a parallel, watered-down approach to sensitive political issues, particularly with respect to Taiwan’s sovereignty status, the omnipresent China factor is being legitimized further. Such an approach homogenizes the parties’ political agendas with respect to Taiwanese autonomy which leads to the island’s perpetual entrapment within the One-China trajectory. Using original and secondary sources in the empirical analysis of the security–trade nexus mainly from the Taiwanese perspective, the article highlights the slow yet steady co-optation of Taiwan’s sovereign interests within China’s sinicization project.